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to admit patients for any length of time 
without any legalformality and without power 
to detain.'
After quoting the above, Lord Goff 
then goes on to state (at p. 115 of his 
judgment):
'Here wejind a central recommendation of 
the Percy commission, and the mischiej it was 
designed to cure. This recommendation was 
implemented, in particular, by section 5(1) of 
the Act of 1959. That the Bill was introduced 
with that recommendation is confirmed by 
ministerial statements made in Parliament at 
the time: see Hansard (HL Debates, 4 June 
1959, cols. 668 and 669).
Following the enactment of the Act of 
1959, section 5(1) was duly implemented in 
the manner foreshadowed by the Percy 
commission, a practice which (as is plain from 
the evidence before the committee) has been 
continued under section 131(1) of the Act of
1 983, which is in identical terms. It is little 
wonder therefore that the judgment of the 
Court oj Appeal in the present case, which 
restricts section 131(1) to voluntary patients, 
should have caused the grave concern which 
has been expressed in the evidence, both (1) 
about the need, following the Court of 
Appeal's judgment, to invoke the power of 
compulsory detention in many cases, 
numbered in their thousands each year, which 
jor nearly 40years had not been necessary 
and would, on the view expressed by the Percy 
commission, be wholly inappropriate, and (2) 
about doubts whether some categories oj 
patients would or would not, in consequence 
of the judgment, require compulsoiy 
detention.'
At p. 1 16 of his judgment Lord Goff 
states:
7 am unable with all respect to accept the 
opinion of the Court of Appeal on the crucial
question of the meaning of section 131(1). 
I wish to stress, however, that the statutory 
histoty of the subsection, which puts the 
matter beyond all doubt, appears not to have 
been drawn to the attention of the Court of 
Appeal ..."
It seems that not only had this issue 
been fully thought through in the early 
1950s, but a seamless harmony between 
common law and statute law was taken 
for granted. Perhaps somebody should be 
trawling through the minutes of the 19th 
century Lunacy Commissioners to 
rediscover what robust common sense 





Liberalisation of postal services in the EU
by Cameron McKenna, Brussels
The postal services sector is now 
emerging at the forefront of the evolution 
of EC competition law. European 
Commission proposals were due at the 
end of 1998 and, at the time of writing 
are expected imminently, for further 
liberalisation of the sector. This follows 
the existing internal market directive on 
postal services, Directive 97/67 on 
common rules for the development ot 
the internal market of Community- postal
services and the improvement of quality- 
of service (OJ 1998 L15/14). These 
proposals can be expected to set out a 
challenging time-scale for full 
liberalisation of the sector. The new 
measures will in any event result in 
incumbent monopoly operators facing 
competition in areas currently reserved 
to them. Directive 97/67 and the 
Commission's competition law decisions 
in the sector have all reflected a strong
o
concern to maintain a strict link between 
the quality of service provided and the 
proportionality of any restrictions of 
competition. The Commission is 
understood to have undertaken a series of 
studies as the basis for the further 
liberalisation proposals now due, with 
regard, inter alia, to cross-border mail, 
the weight and price thresholds and the 
clearance, sorting and transport of mail.
Europe's postal services sector is 
already becoming highly competitive, 
largely no doubt in anticipation of further 
liberalisation at EC level. The Dutch and 
German post offices, amongst the largest 
in Europe, have in particular pursued
active policies of acquiring courier, 
express delivery and parcel distribution 
services companies. The Dutch PTT has 
acquired TNT and Deutsche Post AG has 
made various acquisitions in the last two 
years. The UK Post Office has taken 
advantage of the relaxation of investment 
constraints on it by the UK government 
in late 1998 to acquire the parcel services 
company German Parcel Paket-Logistik 
GmbH, reportedly Germany's fourth 
largest such company (announced in 
January 1999).
The challenge for the incumbent 
public postal services operators ('PPOs') 
will be to expand their activities outside
their core geographical areas and coreo o r
services so as to achieve an overall gain in 
business through the proposed 
liberalisation. This comes at a time when 
electronic communications are already 
eroding the core letter business of PPOs
o
and putting pressure on their traditional 
revenues. The issues for the European 
Commission and the national regulatory 
authorities will be both to maintain the 
required levels of universal service and to 23
ensure that a pro-competitive structure 
of liberalised markets is maintained. The 
Commission has indicated that, as 
liberalisation takes place, it will be 
concerned to ensure that monopoly 
power is not used to extend a protected 
dominant position into liberalised 
activities, or as a means of unjustified 
discrimination in favour of major 
accounts at the expense of small users 
(preface to the Commission's Notice on 
the application of the competition rules 
to the postal sector, the postal services 
notice ('PSN'); OJ 1998 C39/2).
DIRECTIVE 97/67
The current EC postal services regime 
is contained in two main measures: 
Directive 97/67 and the PSN. Directive 
97/67 harmonises the universal service 
obligations to be imposed by member 
states and the activities that may at 
present be reserved to PPOs and requires 
the implementation of specific provisions 
on tariff and accounting transparency, to 
avoid cross-subsidisation. Directive 
97/67 moreover makes the provision of 
universal service, as clearly defined in the 
directive, a pre-condition of continued 
reservation of services to a PPO. In 
addition, the directive specifies the 
following 'essential requirements':
  confidentiality of correspondence;
  security of the postal services network 
as regards transport of dangerous 
xlsrooci : anc
  where justified, data protection, 
environmental and regional planning.
The criteria of the universal service 
obligation, together with these essential 
requirements in the directive, in effect 
constitute a clarification of art. 90(2) of 
the EC Treaty with regard to postal 
services within the directive's specified 
price and weight limits.
At present, most member states have 
defined the postal services activities 
reserved to the incumbent PPO by 
reference to the weight of the postal item 
and, in some cases, the price. Article 7(1) 
of the directive harmonises the services 
which may be reserved as being the 
clearance, sorting, transport and delivery 
of items of domestic correspondence 
within a price limit (of less than five 
times the public tariff for an item of 
correspondence in the first weight step of 
the fastest standard category, provided 
that they weigh less than 350g). Recitals
17 and 18 indicate that the price limit is 
intended to distinguish between the 
reserved service and the express service, 
which is liberalised, due to the fact that 
the added value of express services can 
most effectively be determined by 
reference to the extra price that 
customers are prepared to pay. The 
value-added is measured by reference to 
a number of factors, in particular faster 
and more reliable collection, 
transportation and delivery of postal 
items, together with certain 
supplementary services, such as 
guaranteed delivery by a given date and 
various forms of personalised treatment 
for customers, such as delivery to the 
addressee in person and/or confirmation 
to the sender of delivery.
Member states are required by art. 9 of 
the directive to introduce general
O
authorisations for non-reserved services 
which are outside the scope of the 
universal service, to the extent necessary 
in order to guarantee compliance with 
the essential requirements (principally 
confidentiality of correspondence and 
security of the network as regards 
dangerous goods, as mentioned above). 
Non-reserved services which are within 
the scope of the universal service are to 
be made the subject of authorisation 
procedures, including individual licences, 
to the extent necessary to guarantee 
compliance with the essential 
requirements and to safeguard the 
universal service.
Member states are required by art. 22 
of Directive 97/67 to designate national 
regulatory authorities for the postal 
sector that are legally separate from and 
operationally independent of the postal 
operators. These national regulatory 
authorities are to ensure that compliance 
with the required cost accounting system 
is verified by an independent competent 
body. The Commission also states in its 
PSN that the national regulatory 
authorities should ensure that contracts 
for the provision of reserved services are 
made fully transparent, are separately 
invoiced and distinguished from non- 
reserved services, that terms and 
conditions for services which are in part 
reserved and in part liberalised are 
separate, and that the reserved element is 
open to all postal users, irrespective of 
whether or not the non-reserved 
component is purchased (para.
FURTHER LIBERALISATION
The most significant aspects of 
Directive 97/67 are, however, arguably 
the second stage of liberalisation that is 
provided for in art. 7(3). This requires 
the Parliament and Council to decide not 
later than 1 January 2000:
'without prejudice to the competence of the 
Commission, on thejurther gradual and 
controlled liberalisation of the postal market, 
in particular with a view to the liberalisation 
of cross-border and direct mail ... with effect 
Jrom I January 2003'.
It is the Commission's proposals for 
these measures which were due for the 
end of f998. The European Parliament 
has, however, passed a resolution stating 
that in the absence of these proposals, 
these deadlines of 1 January 2000 and 1 
January 2003 no longer apply Article 11 
further requires the Parliament and 
Council to adopt harmonisation 
measures to ensure that users and 
universal service providers have access to 
the public postal network under 
transparent and non-discriminatory 
conditions. In the same vein, art. 10 also 
requires the Parliament and Council to 
adopt measures necessary for 
harmonised procedures for 
authorisations to be granted at national 
level, governing the commercial1 o o
provision to the public of non-reserved
The Commission is reported to have 
undertaken or commissioned a number 
of studies as the basis of its proposals, 
concerning lowering the weight and price 
limits on reserved activities, liberalisation 
of incoming and outgoing cross-border 
mail, liberalisation of direct mail and 
liberalisation of clearance, sorting and
transport of mail. The latter development 
could result in allowing only delivery, but 
not the clearance, sorting and transport 
of mail, to be reserved. A study has also 
been commissioned on costing and
o
financing of the universal service 
obligations in the postal sector.
UNIVERSAL SERVICE
It is fundamental to Directive 97/67 
that services which can be reserved, 
namely the clearance, sorting, transport 
and delivery ot items of domestic 
correspondence (within the price band 
mentioned above), may only be reserved 
'to the extent necessary to ensure the 
maintenance of universal service'. The 
directive imposes significant universal 
service obligations in art. 3 and 5. 
Member states are to ensure that users 
enjoy the right to a universal service 
involving the permanent provision of a 
postal service of specified quality at all 
points in their territory at affordable 
prices for all users. This means that 
universal service providers are to 
guarantee, as a minimum, one clearance 
and one delivery to the home or premises 
of every natural or legal person, every 
working day and not less than five days a 
week (art. 3(3)). Universal service is to 
apply to the clearance, sorting, transport 
and distribution of postal items of up to 
2kg, and of postal packages of up to 10kg 
(which may be increased by member 
states to 20 kg), and the delivery of postal 
packages from other member states of up 
to 20kg, as well as registered post ando' o
insured post services (art. 3(4) and (5)). 
The universal service is expressly to be 
provided on a non-discriminatory basis 
(and is to be an identical service to users 
under comparable conditions) and must 
comply with the 'essential requirements' 
(art. 5(1)).
In essence, Directive 97/67 and the 
PSN require universal service providers, 
particularly within the field of the 
reserved activities, to provide services 
satisfying the needs of customers to the 
same extent as competitive economic 
operators would have done. This includes 
providing an efficient service which takes 
into account technical developments. 
The Commission is concerned (para. 2.7, 
PSN) that postal operators granted 
special or exclusive rights may let the 
quality of service decline and omit to take 
necessary steps to improve service 
quality.
DIRECTIVE 97/67 AND ART. 
59 & 90 OF THE EC TREATY
As from 11 February 1999, the date of 
required implementation of Directive 
97/67, it will constitute a restriction on 
the provision of postal services, within 
the meaning of art. 59 of the EC Treat); 
to prohibit transportation of postal items 
to other member states or to prohibit 
distribution of cross-border mail, unless 
the postal services are within the 
specified price and weight limits and it 
can clearly be shown to be necessary to 
ensure the maintenance of universal 
service. A member state may well 
infringe art. 59 of the treaty by reserving 
cross-border services to a single PPO
o
even within the specified weight limits, if 
the required levels of universal service 
under the directive were not being met 
for cross-border services.
The directive serves to define the 
application of art. 90(1) of the EC Treaty 
in the postal services sector. Any special 
or exclusive rights granted to PPOs in 
respect of the cross-border provision of 
postal services extending beyond the 
limits permitted in Directive 97/67 or 
beyond what is necessary to ensure the 
maintenance of universal service, would 
need to be separately justified in the light 
of art. 90 and 59 of the EC Treaty 
(para. 5.4, PSN).
Conversely, special or exclusive rights 
whose scope does not go beyond the 
reserved services as defined in Directive 
97/67 are stated by the Commission in its 
PSN to be prima facie justified under art. 
90(2), although such presumption could 
be rebutted if the facts of a case showed 
that the conditions of art. 90(2) were not 
fulfilled, for example if the reservation of 
services went beyond what was necessary 
to ensure the maintenance of universal
The Commission states expressly in 
the PSN a key principle in much of the 
art. 90 case law, namely that where a 
member state grants exclusive rights to an 
operator for services which it does not in 
fact provide so as to satisfy the needs of 
customers to an acceptable level, the 
grant of an exclusive right by the member 
state induces the operator in question, by 
the simple exercise of such right, to limit 
the supply of the relevant service, due to 
the legal impossibility of competition by 
other entities as a result of the exclusivity 
(para. 2.7). This was a feature of the
ECJ's judgment in the Port of Genoa case 
(Merti convenzionali porto di Genova SpA v 
Sidemrgica Gabrielli SpA (Case C-179/90) 
[1991] ECR 1-5889; [1994] 1 CEC 196, 
at para. 17). In that case, the ECJ found 
that the undertakings enjoying exclusive 
rights to organise dock work for third
o o
parties were, as a result, induced inter 
alia to refuse to have recourse to modern 
technology, thereby causing increased 
costs and delays in their operation (at 
para. 19 of the judgment). In the context 
of postal services, the ECJ held in the 
Corbeau case (Re Corbeau (Case C-320/91) 
[1993] ECR 1-2533; [1995] 1 CEC 322) 
that member state legislation granting the 
exclusive right to a PPO to provide postal 
services was contrary to art. 90 where it 
went so far as to prohibit independent 
operators from providing separate 
services, such as express delivery 
services, which met customers' needs but 
which were not offered by the established 
PPO, where such services were 
disassociable from and did not 
compromise the effective performance of 
the postal services of general economic- 
interest performed by the PPO holding 
the exclusive right. The Commission also 
found there to be an infringement of art. 
90, in conjunction with art. 86, in its 
decision concerning the provision in 
Spain of international express courier 
services (Commission Decision 90/456, 
OJ 1990 E233/19), as regards Spanish 
legislation which reserved to the Spanish 
Post Office not only the basic letter 
collection, transport and distribution 
service but also international express 
services. However, the Post Office's 
express service was limited 
geographically in that it was only 
provided from post offices situated in 
certain major cities and did not cover all 
countries of the world, with the result 
that the demand for door-to-door 
express courier services was not fully 
satisfied, whilst due to the monopoly held 
by the Spanish Post Office, competitors 
were unable to offer such a service.
Accordingly, as a result of the 
harmonisation of reserved activities and 
of the universal service obligations in 
Directive 97/67, the member states are 
expected by the Commission to withdraw 
special or exclusive rights for the supply 
of postal services for all activities which 
the directive does not allow to be 
reserved, unless art. 90(2) would apply, 
that is unless the performance of the 
particular tasks assigned to PPOs for the
25
provision of a service of general 
economic interest would be obstructed 
in law or in fact. Also, to the extent that 
the harmonised universal service 
standards are not being met even withino
the field of reserved activities, the 
Commission's PSN sets out the view that 
special or exclusive rights should be 
abolished to the extent necessary to 




Article 90(1), in conjunction with art. 
86, will apply to the use without objective 
justification of a dominant position in a 
reserved market to obtain market power 
on a related or neighbouring market. 
Accordingly, Directive 97/67 contains 
very specific provisions, and the PSN 
very clear statements, against cross- 
subsidisation between reserved and non- 
reserved services. Subsidising activities 
open to competition by allocating their 
cost to reserved services is regarded as 
likely to distort competition in breach of 
art. 86, being an abuse of the PPOs' 
dominant position in the reserved 
market. Moreover, users of the reserved 
services would, as a result of the cross- 
subsidisation, have to bear costs which 
are unrelated to the provision of those 
services.
Directive 97/67 requires member 
states to adopt measures concerning 
tariffs and transparency of accounts of 
universal service providers. Prices must 
be affordable, geared to costs, 
transparent and non-discriminatory 
(without excluding the right of the 
universal service provider to conclude 
individual agreements on prices with 
customers) (art. 12). The accounts of 
universal service providers must (by the 
second anniversary of entry into force of 
the directive, i.e. by 11 February 2000) 
be kept separately for the reserved sector 
and non-reserved services (art. 14). The 
universal service providers' accounting 
systems must allocate costs in accordance 
with specified principles which, by 
reference to the directive and the PSN, 
can be summarised as follows:
  Universal service providers must keep 
separate accounts within their internal 
accounting systems at least for each of 
the services within the reserved sector 
on the one hand and for the non- 
reserved services on the other (art. 
14(2)).
  Such accounts kept by universal 
services providers for non-reserved 
services must distinguish between 
services which are part of the universal 
service and other services (art. 14(2)).
  Services made up of elements falling 
within the reserved and competitive 
services should also distinguish 
between the costs of each element 
(para. 8.6(b)(vi), PSN).
  Costs which can be directly assigned to 
a particular service must be so assigned 
(art. 14(3)(a)).
  Common costs which cannot be 
directly assigned to a particular service 
should, where possible, be allocated on 
the basis of direct analysis of the origin 
of the costs themselves and, if this is 
not possible, common cost categories 
should be allocated on the basis of an 
indirect linkage (based on comparable 
cost structures) to another cost 
category for which a direct allocation is 
possible (art. 14(3)(b)).
  Where the above direct or indirect 
means of cost allocation cannot be 
applied, the cost category should be 
allocated on the basis of a general 
allocator based on the ratio of all 
expenses directly or indirectly 
allocated to the reserved services and 
other services respectively (art.
  The price of competitive services 
offered by a PPO should, because of 
the difficulty of allocating common 
costs, in principle, be at least equal to 
the average total cost of production, 
i.e. thev should cover the direct costs 
plus an appropriate proportion of the 
common and overhead costs of the 
operator (objective criteria such as 
volumes, time or labour usage or 
intensity of usage, being used to 
determine the appropriate proportion) 
(para. 3.4, PSN).
The Commission is well aware that 
price and service discrimination between 
customers or classes of customers can 
easily be practised by PPOs running a 
universal postal network, given the 
significant overheads which cannot be 
fully and precisely assigned to any one 
service in particular. The provisions of 
Directive 97/67 (and the related 
statements in the PSN) are therefore 
important measures to determine how 
accounts should be prepared in order to 
identify whether any cross-subsidisation
is taking place. The Commission stated in 
the PSN (s. 3.4) that it would commence 
investigations under art. 86, or art. 86
o
and 90(1) (or art. 92) on a case-by-case 
basis, if services were offered 
systematically and selectively at a price 
below average total cost.
OTHER ACCOUNTING AND 
FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS
The accounts required to be kept by 
universal service providers should also, in 
the view of the Commission, make it 
possible to assess fully the conditions 
applied at the various access points of the 
public postal network (para. 8.6(b)(vi), 
PSN). The postal services network is 
defined in Directive 97/67 as being the 
universal service provider's system for 
providing the universal service,1 o
comprising its system for clearing postal 
items from access points (physical 
facilities including letter boxes, where 
postal items can be deposited with the 
PPO) throughout the territory, the 
routing and handling of those items from 
network access points to the distribution 
centre, and subsequent distribution to 
the addressee (art. 2(2)). The 
Commission is concerned that the 
confidentiality which often applies to 
conditions of access, including tariffs, 
applied by PPOs to intermediaries, may 
facilitate the application of 
discriminatory conditions to equivalent 
transactions (contrary to art. 86(c)) 
(para. 2.8 and 8.6(b)(vii), PSN). The 
Commission states that member states 
and PPOs should ensure that 
intermediaries, including operators from 
other member states, can choose from 
amongst available access points to the 
public postal network and obtain access 
within a reasonable period and at prices 
based on costs which take into account 
the actual services required (para 
8.6(b)(vii), PSN).
Article 13 of Directive 97/67 also 
requires that universal service providers' 
terminal dues, i.e. charges for 
distribution of incoming cross-border 
mail from another member state (or 
from a third country), are transparent 
and non-discriminatory, based on the 
costs of processing and delivery, and 
comprise remuneration levels related to 
the quality of service achieved. It should 
be noted that in its art. 19(3) Notice 
(under Regulation 17/62, OJ 1998 
C371/7) concerning the Reims II
Agreement concluded between fourteen 
PPOs, the Commission stressed the aims 
of the agreement as being to provide for 
compensation to the parties for cross- 
border deliveries in a way which more 
closely reflects the real costs of delivery 
than previously, and to improve the 
quality of the cross-border mail service, 
by a system of quality of service standards 
(expressed in terms of the percentage of 
incoming cross-border mail from a 
particular PPO which has to be delivered 
within one working day after the day of 
its arrival in the exchange office of the 
receiving PPO) . Further, the parties were 
required to undertake to the 
Commission to comply with obligations 
to be imposed on them, according to 
which they will have to introduce a 
transparent cost accounting system, as 
required by art. 14 of the directive, and 
to provide annual reports on the 
development of international and 
domestic tariffs and costs and on the 
development of cross-border flows. The 
case therefore provides a further example 
of the Commission's concern to find 
some justification for restrictions of 
competition by reference to appropriate 
levels, or improvements, of quality of
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The forthcoming proposals now due 
from the Commissjon can be expected to
set out a challenging time-scale for full
o o
liberalisation of the postal services sector, 
primarily by reference to price and 
weight limits that currently define the 
reserved sectors under Directive 97/67. 
It is also likely, by reference to the studies 
which the Commission has undertaken 
or commissioned, that the new proposals 
could contain time-scales for further 
liberalisation of incoming and outgoing 
cross-border mail, direct mail, and also 
of the clearance, sorting and transport of 
mail, possibly resulting in only delivery 
being permitted as an activity to be 
reserved to universal service providers. 
These various aspects of the liberalisation 
process could well be phased in at 
different points in time with a view to 
completing that process over the next 
few years.
Political opposition can be expected 
from some member states which may 
wish to water down the proposals or to 
defer the time-scale. It is to be hoped 
that the new measures, when adopted, 
contain clarity and certainty and do not, 
as a result of political compromise, 
contain imprecise references back to 
principles of art. 90 of the EC Treaty.
Meanwhile, the very specific 
provisions of Directive 97/67, 
supplemented by the contents of the 
PSN, comprise a clear indication of the 
Commission's views on cost allocation
for the purposes of accounting separation 
to avoid cross-subsidisation between 
reserved and non-reserved activities. 
These can be taken as a guideline by 
analogy in other liberalised sectors of the 
cost-accounting standards expected by 
the Commission of undertakings engaged
o o o
in both reserved and liberalised activities 
within the same sector.
More generally, it is likely that DG IV 
will be requested or will take the 
initiative under art. 90, in conjunction 
with art. 86, of the EC Treaty, to 
scrutinise situations where PPOs seek to 
use their economic strength, derived 
from a historical monopoly of reserved 
activities, to gain an unfair competitive 
advantage in newly-liberalised areas. 
Under both art. 85 and 86, the 
Commission can be expected to apply a 
strict test on the relationship between 
quality of service and the proportionality 
of any restrictions of competition, which 
is also already a key feature of Directive 
97/67. ®
Richard Eccles and 
Robert MacLean
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